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The last year witnessed judicial decisions concerning the law of
obligations spanning a wide scope of topics: error as a vice of consent,I
classification of contracts, 2 stipulations pour autrui,3 repudiation of
agreements, 4 compromises,' subrogation, 6 stipulated remedies,7 quasi-
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or omissions, however, are the sole responsibility of the writer.
1. E.g., Brabham v. Harper, 485 So. 2d 231, 233 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986)
("[Tlhe burden of proof rests on the one seeking reformation of the instrument to
establish the mutual error and mistake by clear and convincing proof, parol evidence
being admissible for this purpose.") (citing Fontenot v. Lewis, 215 So. 2d 161 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1968); Catyb v. Deville, 246 So. 2d 41 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971)).
2. E.g., Degeneres v. Burgess, 486 So. 2d 769 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1986).
3. E.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Williams, 486 So. 2d 849, 851 (La.
App. Ist Cir. 1986) ("[A] stipulation pour autri [sic]'must clearly reveal the intent
of the contracting parties to stipulate some advantage for the third party.") (citing
Teachers' Retirement Sys. v. Louisiana State Employees Retirement Sys., 444 So. 2d
193 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 456 So. 2d 594 (La. 1984);
HMC Management Corp. v. New Orleans Basketball Club, 375 So. 2d 700 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 1384 (La. 1980)); Brooks v. Shipp, 481 So.
2d 655 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
4. E.g., Trinity Carton Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 767 F.2d 184, 195 n.18
(5th Cir. 1985) ("[A]nticipatory repudiation is actionable under Louisiana law.")
(citing Marek v. McHardy, 234 La. 841, 101 So. 2d 689 (1958)), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 1202 (1986).
5. E.g., Miller v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 488 So. 2d 273, 279 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1986); Diggs v. Hood, 772 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1985).
6. E.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Naquin, 488 So. 2d 950 (La. 1986); Toce Oil Co.
v. Central Indus., Inc., 488 So. 2d 331, 336 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 492
So. 2d 1221 (La. 1986); Anthony v. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc., 480 So. 2d 440,
441-42 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 So. 2d 628 (La. 1986); United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Richardson, 486 So. 2d 929, 932 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1986)
("Conventional subrogation by consent of the creditor is possible in all cases and
may be given to any third person who is willing to pay the debt and become subrogated
to the creditor's rights.") (citing LeBoeuf v. Dupre, 378 So. 2d 150 (La. App. Ist
Cir. 1979)); Theriot v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 478 So. 2d 741, 745 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1985).
7. E.g., Bonfanti v. Davis, 487 So. 2d 165, 169-70 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
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contracts,8 proof of obligations, 9 interest,' 0 contribution,'' solidarity, 2
compensation, 3 novation,' 4 and unjust enrichment. 5 In this survey, the
highlights from the past term are discussed.
8. E.g., Marine Design, Inc. v. Zigler Shipyards, 791 F.2d 375, 377 (5th Cir.
1986); Till v. Delta School of Commerce, Inc., 487 So. 2d 180, 182 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1986) ("The burden is on the party seeking quantum meruit to show the value
of the services rendered.") (citing Dalgarn v. New Orleans Land Co., 162 La. 891,
Ill So. 271 (1927)); Coastal Timbers, Inc. v. Regard, 483 So. 2d 1110, 1113 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1986) ("Recoverable items include the actual cost of materials and
labor, including general overhead, and a reasonable or fair profit.") (citing Houma
Armature Works & Supply, Inc. v. Landry, 417 So. 2d 42 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1982);
Skains v. White, 391 So. 2d 1327 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980); Brummett v. Hamel's
Dairy, Inc., 324 So. 2d 502 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975)); Remn Constr. Corp. v. Keating,
478 So. 2d 207, 210 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); Boudreaux v. Lininger, 475 So. 2d
11l3, 1114 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
9. E.g., Viator v. Bishop, 488 So. 2d 1228, 1229 (La. App 4th Cir. 1986) ("A
party to the suit may qualify as the 'one credible witness' required by La.C.C. Art.
1846.") (citing Samuels v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 342 So. 2d 661 (La. 1977);
Strecker v. Credico Fin., Inc., 444 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984); B. M.
Albrecht Elec., Inc. v. Griffin, 413 So. 2d 246 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982)); Hilliard
v. Yarbrough, 488 So. 2d 1038, 1040 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986) ("Although a plaintiff
may serve as the witness, other corroborating circumstances must be proved. The
corroborating circumstances may be 'general' and need not prove every detail of
plaintiff's case.") (citing Bordlee v. Pat's Constr. Co., Inc., 316 So. 2d 16 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1975); Miller v. Harvey, 408 So. 2d 946 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981)); Nash v.
Nash, 486 So. 2d 1011, 1014-15 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986); Courtesy Ford, Inc. v.
Weatherly, 485 So. 2d 93, 96 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
10. E.g., McLaurin v. Holley, 484 So. 2d 807 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1986).
i. E.g., Martin v. American Petrofina, Inc., 785 F.2d 543 (5th Cir. 1986); Diggs
v. Hood, 772 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1985); Thompson v. Cane Garden Apartments, 480
So. 2d 373 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); Bergeron v. Amerada Hess Corp., 478 So. 2d
1308 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
12. E.g., Martin v. American Petrofina, Inc., 785 F.2d 543 (5th Cir. 1986); Aetna
Ins. Co. v. Naquin, 488 So. 2d 950 (La. 1986); Diggs v. Hood, 772 F. 2d 190 (5th
Cir. 1985).
13. E.g., Publicker Chem. Corp. v. Belcher Oil Co., 792 F.2d 482, 485 (5th Cir.
1986); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Southern Excavation, Inc., 480 So. 2d
920 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 481 So. 2d 1337 (La. 1986).
14. E.g., Holloway v. Acadian News Agency, Inc., 488 So. 2d 328, 330 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1986) ("Novation may not be presumed; the intention to extinguish the
original obligation must be clear and unequivocal."); City Bank & Trust Co. v. New
Iberia Hotel Partners, 486 So. 2d 1201, 1204 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986) ("The general
rule is that the new obligation must be valid and binding in order to replace the
former obligation and thus effect a novation.") (citing Tucker v. Stone, 115 So. 2d
636 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959)).
15. E.g., Scafide v. C. Itoh Indus. Mach., Inc., 483 So. 2d 151, 154 (La. App.




Two years ago the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Ducre v. Executive Officers of Halter Marine, Inc. 6 rather re-
markably stated that "a tortfeasor's cause of action for contribution
against its cotortfeasor, where they are liable in solido, arises, not
when the tort occurs but when judicial demand by the injured party
is made upon one of the cotortfeasors."'' 7 To support this conclu-
sion, the court relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court of
Louisiana in Brown v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co."' and the
opinion of the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Lanier
v. T. L. James & Co.19 It appears, particularly since the federal
Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its view from Ducre this past year in Martin
v. American Petrofina, Inc.,20 the time has come to sort through
these matters.
To start, it must be noted that under Erie' the federal courts
are bound to follow the pronouncements in the reported opinions
of the appellate courts of Louisiana regarding substantive issues of
the law of Louisiana.22 And the unmistakable assessment of the
appellate courts of the State of Louisiana is that a claim in tort
for contribution or indemnification does not vest until one debtor
16. 752 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1985).
17. Id. at 987-88 (footnote omitted).
18. 243 La. 271, 142 So. 2d 796 (La. 1962).
19. 148 So. 2d 100 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1962).
20. 785 F.2d 543 (5th Cir. 1986).
21. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
22. Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, otherwise known as the Rules of
Decision Act, proclaimed that "[t]he laws of the several States, except where the
Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts
of the United States, in cases where they apply." This policy now exists at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1982). In the words of Justice Brandeis, the author for the Court in Erie,
And whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a
statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal
concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power
to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether
they be local in their nature or "general," be they commercial law or a
part of the law of torts.
304 U.S. at 78, 58 S. Ct. at 822. The quintessential summary of Erie, its impli-
cations, and its progeny (including Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65
S. Ct. 1464 (1945), Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525
(1958), and Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S. Ct. 1136 (1965)) is found in
C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of the Federal Courts, §§ 54-56 (3d ed. 1976).
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in solido either is cast in judgment23 or actually pays the judgment.14
Nonetheless, because the three federal district courts of Louisiana25
are constrained to honor the precedents of the United States Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals,2 6 the following comments are directed at
the Fifth Circuit as a call for the reappraisal and reexamination
of Ducre and Martin.
Prior to the Third Party Practice Act of 1954, no mechanism
existed for one debtor in solido to compel the appearance in the
litigation of other potential solidary obligors.27 Therefore, each debtor
in solido, bound for the whole of the obligation, 28 was at the mercy
of the creditor's whim in naming defendants in the petition. The
solidary debtor, moreover, "could not enforce contribution from
a person whom he asserted to be a joint wrongdoer unless and
until both had been cast in solido by a judgment." 2 9 Due to judicial
resistance 0 to the scheme of the Third Party Practice Act, a work-
23. E.g., Thompson v. Cane Garden Apartments, 480 So. 2d 373, 374 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1985) ("[Plrescription does not begin to run on a claim for idem-
nification [or contribution] until the party seeking it is, itself, cast in judgment.")
(citing Smith v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 399 So. 2d 1193 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 406 So. 2d 604 (La. 1981)); Bergeron v. Amerada Hess Corp.,
478 So. 2d 1308 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985); McKneely v. Don Coleman Constr.
Co., Inc., 441 So. 2d 497 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); Guidry v. Hoogvliets, 411
So. 2d 629 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); Matt v. Cox 408 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 499 So. 2d 913 (La. 1986); Blue Streak Enterprises, Inc. v.
Gulf Coast Marine, Inc., 370 So. 2d 633 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
24. E.g., Thomas v. W & W Clarklift, Inc., 375 So. 2d 375, 378 (La. 1979)
("The right to enforce contribution is not complete until payment of the common
obligation."); Brown v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 243 La. 271, 142 So. 2d
796 (1962); Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933); Sincer v. Bell,
47 La. Ann. 1548, 18 So. 755 (1895).
25. The three federal district courts are the Eastern, the Middle, and the West-
ern.
26. E.g., Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352, 359 (5th Cir. 1981) ("ll]n this
circuit one panel cannot overrule another .... ) (emphasis added). With even
greater force the district courts must adhere to the opinions of the Fifth Circuit.
27. 1954 La. Acts 433. See McMahon, Courts and Judicial Procedure, 15 La.
L. Rev. 38 (1954).
28. Old article 2091 of the Louisiana Civil Code stated as follows: "There is
an obligation in solido on the part of the debtors, when they are all obliged to
the same thing, so that each may be compelled for the whole, and when the payment
which is made by one of them, exonerates the others toward the creditor." New
article 1794 continues this view of passive solidarity: "An obligation is solidary
for the obligors when each obligor is liable for the whole performance. A per-
formance rendered by one of the solidary obligors relieves the others of liability
toward the obligee."
29. Brown, 243 La. at 275, 142 So. 2d at 798.
30. Perhaps many of the difficulties may be traced to an improper focus of
the function of impleader. In Ferrantelli v. Sanchez, 90 So. 2d 351, 354-55 (La.
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able method for solidary obligors seeking contribution did not ap-
pear until the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure3 and the
attendant amendments to the Civil Code.3"
When difficulties in the operation and interplay of old3" article
2103 of the Civil Code,3 4 as amended by Act 30 of 1960, and
articles 11l 1" through 1116 of the Code of Civil Procedure surfaced
in Brown v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., the Supreme Court of
Louisiana noted this:
It is true that as of that time the injured party's right and
cause of action against either or both of two joint tort-
feasors come into being; and conversely, the obligation of
each of the latter to the claimant also commences. On the
other hand, the rights and obligations as between the joint
wrongdoers do not then arise, because they are not created
by virtue of the commission of the tort and of the pro-
visions of Revised Civil Code Article 2315. Rather, they
spring from the principle of contribution, enunciated in Ar-
App. Orl. 1956), it was assumed "that the Third-Party Practice Act was enacted
to afford an additional remedy to a plaintiff." Quite to the contrary, "Ithe Lou-
isiana concept of impleader appears to exist in order to grant the defendant, not
the plaintiff, a valuable procedural right .... " Note, Louisiana Civil Procedure-
Prescription of Third Party Demands-A Proposed Amendment to the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 1044, 1051 n.48 (1972).
31. 1960 La. Acts 30.
32. One part of Act 30 of 1960, effective January I, 1961, amended and
reenacted old article 2103 of the Civil Code to read as follows:
When two or more debtors are liable in solido, whether the obligation
arises from a contract, a quasi contract, an offense, or a quasi offense,
it should be divided between them. As between the solidary debtors, each
is liable only for his virile portion of the obligation.
A defendant who is sued on an obligation which, if it exists, is solidary
may seek to enforce contribution, if he is cast, against his solidary co-
debtor by making him a third party defendant in the suit, as provided
in Article 1111 through 1116 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whether or
not the third party defendant was sued by the plaintiff initially, and
whether the defendant seeking to enforce contribution if he is cast admits
or denies liability on the obligation sued on by the plaintiff.
33. The revised articles of the Civil Code, under Act 331 of 1984, are referred
to as "new" and any prior law, repealed or amended and re-enacted by Act 331
of 1984, is designated as "old." See Schewe, Developments in the Law, 1983-
1984-Obligations, 45 La. L. Rev. 447, 447 n.2 (1985).
34. The essentials of old article 2103 presently are contained in new articles
1804 and 1805.
35. La. Code Civ. P. art. il I, in part, provides that the "defendant in a
principal action by petition may bring in any person, including a codefendant, who
is his warrantor, or who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the principal
demand." See Note, supra note 30.
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ticle 2103 and our jurisprudence, which is required of so-
lidary obligors when one has been compelled to pay the full
amount of the obligation. See Sincer v. Bell, 47 La. Ann.
1548, 18 So. 755 and Quatray v. Wicker et al., 178 La.
289, 151 So. 208. And it is only after judicial demand has
been made on one of two or more solidarily obligated tort
feasors that he can have any possible interest in seeking
contribution. 36
Accordingly, the opinion of the court in Brown stands precisely
for the conclusion opposite the one reached by the panel in Ducre.
In other words, the right to demand contribution vests in a debtor
in solido when he has satisfied fully the obligation. The paying
obligor then is subrogated 37 to the position of the creditor, and a
claim for contribution or indemnification is ripe. Of course, to
truncate procedurally the unwieldy system of staying the demand
for contribution or indemnification until one solidary debtor com-
pletely performs in favor of the creditor, a third-party demand may
be asserted much earlier 3 -during the litigation of the creditor's
action.
Speculation is fruitless as to why the United States Fifth Circuit
has so poorly read the law of Louisiana regarding when a demand
for contribution or indemnification must be brought. A reversal en
banc now may be needed" to overturn Ducre and Martin; this,
however, is what should be done. The correct statement of law is
put forward simply: while a claim for contribution or indemnifi-
cation may be asserted procedurally by one debtor in solido against
36. 243 La. at 275, 142 So. 2d at 798 (emphasis added).
37. Old article 2161(3) stated that subrogation takes place of right "[f]or the
benefit of him who, being bound with others, or for others, for the payment of
the debt, had an interest in discharging it." New article 1829(3) basically repeats
this text. While the traditional view has been that the language "bound with or
for" demanded a solidary relationship among the debtors, Pringle-Associated Mort-
gage Corp. v. Eanes, 254 La. 705, 226 So. 2d 502 (1969), the recent ruling in
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Naquin, 488 So. 2d 950 (La. 1986), has rejected that premise.
The opinion in Naquin is reviewed in this survey. See infra notes 42-61 and ac-
companying text.
38. La. Code Civ. P. art I111. The claim may be reserved, however, for reasons
of strategy to avoid the plaintiff/creditor from benefiting from the skirmishes among
the debtors/defendants.
39. E.g., Farnham v. Bristow Helicopters, Inc., 776 F.2d 535, 537 (5th Cir.
1985); United States v. Albert, 675 F.2d 712, 713 (5th Cir. 1982); Howard v.
Gonzalez, 658 F.2d 352, 359 (5th Cir. 1981). Another solution to the pernicious
problem is for a state court opinion, preferably of the Supreme Court of Louisiana,
to announce plainly the correct rule. In "diversity cases" the Fifth Circuit is "to
follow subsequent state court decisions . . . clearly contrary to a previous decision"
of the Fifth Circuit. Farnham, 776 F.2d at 537.
[Vol. 47
OBLIGATIONS
one or more other solidary obligors, prior to payment of the entire
debt, the demand does not vest until the performance to the creditor
has been rendered.4 0 As one of several consequences, prescription
does not commence to run on the action for contribution or in-
demnification until payment. 41
Solidarity and Subrogation
Several years ago Professor H. Alston Johnson III, writing in
this forum, 2 waxed eloquent on the "curious dichotomy in Lou-
isiana law on the question of legal subrogation of an insurer to
the rights of its insured against a wrongdoer upon payment of the
insured's claim." '43 Certainly, according to Professor Johnson, "le-
gal subrogation should be the rule and . . . cases holding the con-
trary should be disapproved." 4 4 In Aetna Insurance Co. v. Naquin,45
the supreme court adopted the result suggested by Professor John-
son; the rationale employed in the decision, however, is question-
able, given the backdrop to the litigation.
The consolidated lawsuits reported as Aetna Insurance Co. v.
Naquin involved these fundamental facts: Denis Ficarra, the owner
of an apartment building, contracted with Robert Naquin for the
repair of a roof of the building; the work was not performed
properly, and as a consequence, the structure and the property of
certain lessees of the premises were damaged by a rainstorm; the
tenants made claims for the losses against Mr. Ficarra; and Aetna
Insurance Company, Mr. Ficarra's insurer, after settling with the
lessees, instituted an action for reimbursement from Mr. Naquin. 6
After a bench trial, the district court rendered judgment against
Mr. Naquin, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed.4 7
The principal legal question posed to the supreme court was
whether "Aetna will be subrogated [to the rights of Mr. Ficarra
or his lessees against Mr. Naquin] if . . . it was bound with or
for Naquin and . . . Aetna had an interest in discharging the debt." 4 8
40. Thomas, 375 So. 2d at 378; Brown, 243 La. at 275, 142 So. 2d at 798;
Quatray, 178 La. at 292, 151 So. at 212; Sincer, 47 La. Ann. at 1549, 18 So.
at 755.
41. E.g., Thomas, 375 So. 2d at 378. This subject is addressed in Note, supra
note 30.
42. Johnson, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978
Term-Obligations, 39 La. L. Rev. 675 (1979).
43. Id. at 675.
44. Id.
45. 488 So. 2d 950 (La. 1986).
46. Id. at 951.
47. 478 So. 2d 1352 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
48. 488 So. 2d at 953.
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In opposition to the subrogation, Mr. Naquin urged that Aetna
Insurance Company had not been solidarily bound with any debtor
and that the relationship in solido was mandated for legal sub-
rogation to flow under the old article 2161 of the Civil Code. 49
The supreme court, through Justice Blanche, rejected this argument:
"It is unnecessary to examine the relationship of the parties for
solidarity . . . LSA-C.C. art. 2161(3) does not require solidarity." 5
Rather, persuaded by desirable reasons of policy, the majority pro-
claimed as follows:
[L]egal subrogation is the more desirable and legally coh-
esive rule. First and foremost are the promptness and cer-
tainty of recovery guaranteed the victim. The victim will
receive from the wrongdoer and his insurer the full amount
of his damages. He will also receive this payment quickly
from his insurer, especially if the insurer knows it will later
be able to recover from the wrongdoer. If the insurer is
able to be reimbursed for a loss caused by another's fault,
this success will be reflected in lower premiums. Although
the insured is paying for this quick and prompt coverage,
the premium he pays ought to reflect the record of success
of the insurer in casting this loss back on the wrongdoer
when possible. To refuse to give the insurer a right to sub-
rogation is to cast the loss on the insured class, rather than
the person by whose fault the loss occurred. This undoubt-
edly has the effect of higher premiums on these types of
insurance. Neither can the wrongdoer complain that he has
not been accorded a reduction in the damages which he has
caused. Society has an interest in requiring the wrongdoer
to pay the full amount of damage he has caused if he is
able.5 '
49. The court divided the contentions against subrogation into two parts:
First the argument is raised that Aetna cannot be validly subrogated to
the Ficarras [sic] contract claim because payment under the insurance pol-
icy was made to the tenants and not the Ficarras .... The second ar-
gument . . . [is] that to be bound with or for Naquin, within the meaning
of LSA-C.C. art. 2161(3), Aetna and Naquin must be solidary obligors.
Id. at 952-53.
50. Id. at 954.
51. Id. The language of the court follows the thoughts earlier expressed by
Professor Johnson:
Should there be a rule of law (legal subrogation) which would require
that a proven wrongdoer eventually bear the loss caused by his wrong-
doing, by reimbursing an insurer which may have borne that loss because
of a contract with the injured party? Or, on the other hand, should the
[Vol. 47
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Accordingly, Aetna Insurance Company, not "a mere volunteer, 52
paid the claims of the lessees in its own name and was subrogated
to their position as a matter of law.
The result reached by the court undeniably is laudable," but
the reasoning of the decision is flawed at best and somewhat tor-
tured. With respect to the latter notation, in relying upon comment
(c) to new article 1829 of the Civil Code' 4 in furtherance of the
proposition that solidarity is unnecessary under paragraph (3) of
either old article 2161 or new article 1829 for subrogation to func-
tion, the majority begs the question." The comment simply is a
restatement of the substance of new article 1797,56 the sentiments
wrongdoer escape eventual responsibility for any of the loss because he
had the good fortune to injure a party who had provided for the loss
through a contract of insurance?
Johnson, supra note 42, at 679.
52. 488 So. 2d at 954. Because an insurer is not a mere volunteer, it "should
not fit under the general rule of [old] LSA-C.C. art. 2134." Id. Old article 2134
of the Civil Code provided as follows:
An obligation may be discharged by any person concerned in it, such as
a coobligor or a surety.
The obligation may even be discharged by a third person no way concerned
in it, provided that person act in the name and for the discharge of the
debtor, or that, if he act in his own name, he be not subrogated to the
rights of the creditor.
53. Only Chief Justice Dixon and Associate Justice Calogero disagreed, and
they dissented: "The insurer pays its own obligation. There is no subrogation
without contract or statute." 488 So. 2d at 955 (Dixon, C.J., dissenting).
54. La. Civ. Code art. 1829, comment (c):
Under this Article, an obligor who pays a debt he owes with others or
for others is legally subrogated to the rights of the obligee only if he
brings an action against the others as a result of that payment. An obligor
is bound "with" another under this Article regardless of whether his
obligation arises from the same act as the obligation of the other or from
a different act. See Gay & Co. v. Blanchard, 32 La. Ann. 497 (1880).
55. The case of Gay & Co. v. Blanchard, 32 La. Ann. 497 (1880), relied upon
by the drafters of comment (c) to new article 1829, plainly involved solidarity.
Indeed, the issue addressed by the court was whether the commencement of an
action against the endorser of a promissory note served to interrupt the prescription
running against the maker of the instrument. For this, the court noted the following:
Solidarity may be perfect or imperfect. It is perfect, and the obligors are
the mandataries of each other, when by the same act, at the same time,
they bind themselves to the performance of the same thing. It is imperfect
... when they bind themselves to the same thing by different acts or at
different times.
Id. at 502.
56. La. Civ. Code art. 1797: "An obligation may be solidary though it derives
from a different source for each obligor."
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of old article 2092, 7 and the principles of the now-dismissed doc-
trine of imperfect solidarity.58 Comment (c) to new article 1829(3),
however, is not authority for the statement that solidarity is ir-
relevant for that provision of the law of legal subrogation. Perhaps
even more significant, from a perspective of methodology, is the
failure of the court to align the parties correctly and identify Aetna
Insurance Company as a solidary debtor with either Mr. Naquin
or Mr. Ficarra or both.
The court would have been on firm ground if it had stated
that Aetna Insurance Company was solidarily liable with Mr. Fi-
carra under the Direct Action Statute59 vis-a-vis the tenants. Ad-
ditionally, the court would have been justified in so doing if it
had likened Aetna Insurance Company to an uninsured/underinsured
motorist carrier 60 and, thus, liable in solido with Mr. Naquin for
the claims of the lessees or Mr. Ficarra or both. 6'
Unnecessarily, the court abandoned the requirement of solidarity
between or among the debtors to trigger the invocation of old
article 2161(3), or new article 1829(3) when one of the obligors
satisfies the debt of the creditor. Without overturning Aetna In-
57. Old article 2092 of the Civil Code provided as follows:
The obligation may be in solido, although one of the debtors be obliged
differently from the other to the payment of one and the same thing;
for instance, if the one be but conditionally bound, whilst the engagement
of the other is pure and simple, or if the one is allowed a term which
is not granted to the other.
See Schewe, Debtors in Solido: On Plain Language and Uncertainty with Mention
of the Revocatory Action, 32 Loy. L. Rev. 13 (1986).
58. "The distinction drawn between perfect and imperfect solidarity is untenable
and must be rejected." Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789, 791 (La. 1980). See
Comment, Tilting against Windmills: A Solidary Rejoinder, 41 La. L. Rev. 1279
(1981); Comment, Prescribing Solidarity: Contributing to the Indemnity Dilemma,
41 La. L. Rev. 659 (1981).
59. La. R.S. 22:655 (1978) states, in part, as follows:
The injured person or his or her survivors or heirs hereinabove referred
to, at their option, shall have a right of direct action against the insurer
within the terms and limits of the policy; and such action may be brought
against the insurer alone, or against both the insured and insurer jointly
and in solido ....
60. Basically, an uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier provides coverage for
the plaintiff/creditor when the debtor/defendant is not adequately insured. Under
Hoefly v. Govt. Emp. Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 443 (La. 1982), the carrier is liable
solidarily with the tortfeasor and the insurer of the tortfeasor in favor of the
plaintiff/creditor.
61. See Fertitta v. All State Ins. Co., 462 So. 2d 159 (La. 1982); McKenzie
& Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1984-1985-Insurance Law, 46 La. L. Rev.
475 (1986); Schewe, Developments in the Law, 1984-1985-Obligations. 46 La. L.
Rev. 595, 600-06 (1986).
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surance Co. v. Naquin, the supreme court may disclaim the rea-
soning of the opinion and return certainty and stability to this area
of the law, through one substantial improvement-the ruling that
an insurer is entitled to the benefits of legal subrogation to the
rights of the insured upon payment.
Compromises and Solidarity-Revisited Again
Last year 62 critical attention was devoted to the case of Fertitta
v. Allstate Insurance Co.63 Subsequently, the United States Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals treated the same issue-the evaluation of
a plaintiff's/creditor's claim after the release of one or more, but
less than all obligors in solido-in Diggs v. Hood.64 While com-
mentary regarding the opinion in Diggs v. Hood exists elsewhere, 65
a brief mention of this subject and a proposed analysis of the
ofte thorny problems attendant to it certainly are worthwhile.
An automobile accident involving Billie Hood and Clarence
Diggs, who was severely injured, resulted in Billie Hood, the owner
of the vehicle driven by Billie Hood, and their insurers filing a
third-party demand against Ford Motor Company, the manufac-
turer, for contribution or indemnification. The plaintiff also amended
his complaint to name Ford Motor Company as a defendant. Af-
terwards, the "Hood interests paid Diggs $1 million to compromise
his claims against them." ' 66 Each party to the contract of compro-
mise reserved "any and all claims" against Ford Motor Company.
In turn, Ford Motor Company sought summary dismissal of the
third-party action against it, and the district court sustained the
motion. A panel of the fifth circuit, with Judge Rubin serving as
the author of the opinion, affirmed. 67
Although neither the old nor the new articles of the Civil Code
address the "question whether the settling defendant has a claim
for contribution, '68 the realistic possibilities created by the credi-
tor's compromise with one or more, but not all, solidary obligors
are two-fold: "(1) the nonsettling tortfeasor later cast in judgment
may seek contribution from the settling tortfeasor; and (2) the set-
tling tortfeasor may seek contribution for the settlement amount
62. Schewe, supra note 61, at 600-06.
63. 462 So. 2d 159 (La. 1985).
64. 772 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1985).
65. Schewe, supra note 57, at 33-36.
66. 772 F.2d at 192.
67. Id. at 197.
68. Id. at 195.
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in excess of his share of liability from the nonsettling tortfeasor. ' 69
The first proposal is not available under the law of Louisiana,70
for no action may be brought by the nonsettling debtor in solido.7'
In addition, nothing may be demanded by the solidary obligor ex-
ecuting the compromise because he has not paid all of the debt,
or any part which would accrue to the nonsettling obligor. 72 Since
the liability of the nonsettling obligor "is reduced . . . by the share
that would have been due [in contribution) by the settling tortfeasor
had he not been released," 71 the debtor not a party to the com-
promise will not have to pay the share of the debt attributable to
the settling tortfeasor. To state it simply, "[tihe right to contri-
bution exists only in favor of a party who has paid what someone
else owes." ' 74 Even though the settling tortfeasor may have paid
more than his share, since the nonsettling tortfeasors' shares are
not reduced by this overpayment, they owe no contribution.
With respect to this subject, the following conclusions have been
printed previously but an echo may prove of value:
[T]he analysis in Diggs v. Hood is right; the court in Fertitta
v. Allstate Insurance Co. completely missed the mark; and
there is a need for clear and specific legislation on the
subject. The first paragraph of article 1803 requires mod-
ification to provide plainly that the release of one obligor
in solido results in a deduction by operation of law from
the claim of the creditor the share of the debt owed by
the obligor compromising, not the sum paid in consideration
69. Id. The court further elaborated upon the dilemma:
Under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1812 and Civil Code
article 2103, the nonsettling tortfeasor's liability is reduced only by the
share that would have been due by the settling tortfeasor had he not been
released. The remaining tortfeasor, therefore, can be held liable for no
more, and for no less, than his own share of the judgment. While in
theory each joint tortfeasor is potentially liable for all of the plaintiff's
damages, the effect of the settlement is to reduce the actual exposure of
the nonsettling tortfeasor to that part of the damages his fault is found
to have caused. He remains liable, however, for the full amount of damage
his own negligence occasioned. No part of what has already been paid
in settlement accrues to his benefit. Consequently, the settling tortfeasor
has no claim for contribution because his payment does not discharge any
part of the debt due by the other tortfeasor.
Id. at 195-96 (footnote omitted).
70. Id. (citing Garrett v. Safeco Ins. Co., 433 So. 2d 209, 210 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1983)).
71. Schewe, supra note 57, at 33-36.
72. 772 F.2d at 196-97.
73. Id. at 196 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
74. Id. at 197.
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in the transaction. If a statutory change is not made and
if the supreme court does not reverse its stand in Fertitta
v. Allstate Insurance Co., the cloud of uncertainty in this
area will continue to cast a shadow over what should be
straight-forward principles promoting settlements .7
Perhaps solidarity will not demand so much attention next year. 76
75. Schewe, supra note 57, at 36 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
76. But do not count on it. See, e.g., Schewe, supra note 61; Schewe, supra
note 33; Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Obligations, 42 La. L.
Rev. 388 (1982); Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Obligations, 41
La. L. Rev. 355 (1981); Johnson, supra note 42; Johnson, The Work of the Lou-
isiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Obligations, 36 La. L. Rev. 375
(1976); Johnson, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974
Term-Obligations, 35 La. L. Rev. 280 (1975); Johnson, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Obligations, 34 La. L. Rev. 231 (1974).
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